Well, I should qualify that. The most typical response is to simply ignore the point. But among those who do actually try to come to terms with it, the almost universal response is to begin to twitch, then start uttering blatant fallacies, and then, in the final stages, to repeat themselves over and over until finally they have rendered themselves completely absurd.
In the case of our own Singring (and we speak of him with affection, since he has do so much to help us illustrate our point here), we have someone who perfectly encapsulates all that can be said of those who have tried to come to terms with what has come to be known in philosophy as the "problem of induction," articulated by the 18th century philosopher David Hume.
Let's review the problem for just a moment, just to get it clear in our minds. Here's what can be considered rational--and this was Hume's point in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, the book which articulates the problem with induction:
Something is rational if it is characterized either by inductive or a deductive inference.
A deductive argument runs something like this:
All men are mortalIt begins with a universal statement ("All men are mortal") and ends in a more particular statement ("Socrates is mortal"). Induction goes the other direction. It begins in particular observations and ends in a universal statement:
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal
On every past day, the sun has risen in the morningThe issue of induction arises because of the second premise, which is the same in every inductive argument: "The future will alwasy be like the past." Hume asks, how can we justify that premise, since it does not intuitively follow from the first?
The future will always be like the past
Therefore, in every future day, the sun will rise in the morning
As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers: but does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same: I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact. (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section IV, Part II)How do you get from one to the other, or justify the second premise at all? These are the only two kinds of rational procedures that exist. But if you are arguing for the rationality of induction, then you can't use induction to do it, since that would be circular. Of course that hasn't stopped Singring from doing it repeatedly, and just repeating a circular argument over and over doesn't make it any less circular. That procedure is circular and therefore irrational. You can't appeal to induction to justify induction. As Hume says:
It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. (Enquiry, Section IV, Part II)So the only thing left is deduction, but you can't justify induction through deduction either, since contracting the conclusion of an inductive argument does not lead to the contradiction of either of the premises (which must happen if the argument is deductively valid).
Since neither deduction nor induction can be used to justify induction, and since no other rational procedure exists, induction is not rationally justifiable. Now this doesn't mean that it shouldn't be used or that we shouldn't accept its conclusions. Our Singring jumped to the conclusion that I was saying that, but I did not say that. Although induction cannot be justified rationally, it is justified intuitively: by custom and tradition--the very things the scientistically-minded claim to spurn.
The problem of induction posed by Hume has never been resolved, and the only attempt that even makes any sense is that by Karl Popper. But Popper doesn't really resolve the dilemma, he tries to do an end run and say that science doesn't really use induction in the first place. Not a lot of people have been convinced.
I was arguing that the fundamental assumptions of science--induction and causation--were not themselves rationally justifiable in order to point up one of the absurdities of the rationalist pretensions of people like Jerry Coyne: the claim that science is "rational" and religion (and, apparently philosophy) is not.
And, as if to prove my point, people like Singring come along and try to claim that we know the future will always be like the past because the future has always been like the past in the past. In other words, trying to prove induction by appealing to induction. Induction makes sense, but atheists like Singring think it's because it's based on reason, when, in fact, it's not.
I can see why Singring has tied himself up in such complex knots to avoid the obvious conclusion. He and his fellow scientific atheists are in a pickle: either they have to admit that the method science uses is based on a rationally unjustifiable premise and reject it because it's based on faith, or they have to accept it but admit that it is based on custom and tradition, those hoary old concepts championed by the feeble-minded.
Why is it that we religious people, who aren't rational, can figure this out, but scientific atheists, the rational ones, are completely clueless (or simply fudging)?
Just keep repeating to yourselves: "Science is rational but religion is not. Science is rational but religion is not. Science is rational but religion is not ..." It's bound to be true if you repeat it enough times.
22 comments:
That's a very well-written post, Martin and one that really destroys the straw man you call Singring.
One simple point needs to be made and it will become very clear how beside the point your entire essay is:
If you define the 'rational' as something that must be the 100% iron-clad conclusion derived from provable premises, then of course induction is not 'rational' (as you and Hume define the word). I conceded this in my last post! However, I also pointed out that this is not the sense in which I use the word 'rational', which you conveniently omit from your essay above. I know that Hume is considered one of the fathers of modern philosophy, but I simply will have to decline in prescribing to his definition of what is rational and what is not.
If you include a premise such as this:
'"The future will ALWAYS be like the past."'(my emphasis)
then refuting the argument is like shooting fish in a barrel. The problem: I specifically pointed out to you that I do not and never have supported that premise - I am of the opinion that there is very little on can KNOW and truths based on induction are certainly one such thing! It would really help your readers if you actually presented the views of me and others accurately.
Let me illustrate this point:
Would you say it is 'rational' to live one's life (i.e. make plans, schedule events etc.) each day, based on the induction that a day will follow the present one?
Yes or no?
Your answer will illustrate how perfectly absurd your (and Hume's) definition of the word 'rational' is when it comes to induction. It will also illustarte how dishonest your essay is. But as with all other questions I ask you, I don't think I will ever get an answer.
One final example of the bald-faced dishonesty you engage in, Martin:
I quote from your essay:
'people like Singring come along and try to claim that we KNOW the future will always be like the past because the future has always been like the past in the past.' (my emphasis)
This is what I actually said in the post you are replying to:
'Of course I can't say things will ALWAYS happen the way they did in the past or that I KNOW past experience yields truth! I never claimed any of that. You keep speaking in terms of certainty, when I have clearly stated that all we can do when it comes to the future is make evidence based inductions that may or may not be true. However, based on past results, we can be pretty confident that our inductive reasoning is accurate, but we can never be sure.'
Which part of the words 'can't' and 'know' do you not understand, Martin?
You seem to be incapable of contemplating the possible, rather than the absolute or certain. This is the only way I can make sense of your refusal to detect the difference in what I am actually saying and what you claim I am saying.
P.S.:
Still no answer on why the universe is contingent (all we have so far is: 'its self-evident') and how philosophy can adress whether or not the statement 'science gives us access to truth' is true.
And yet it moves.
"Jerry Coyne's pretentious claim that science is rational"
Mr Coyne never used the word "rational" in his entire opinion piece. And he certainly never made a claim, that science was based on Rational logic as based on formal theoretical logic. The closest that I can find is "Science operates by using evidence and reason."
Rational argument is almost useless for everyday decisions. Most of our day-to-day decisions are based on sensible reasoning, not formal logician rational argument.
Formal logic cannot deal with fuzzy premises and most (maybe all) real life premises are fuzzy.
Premise: I want to keep my child from harm.
Premise: My child may get hurt when playing group sport.
Premise: My child keeps fit and learns social skills when playing group sport.
Does my child play football on the weekend?
Finally, on a lighter note the spectrum of science (totally safe for all readers): http://xkcd.com/435/
Singring,
If you don't like fish in a barrel, you should try shooting at a moving target some time. So now we've shifted the definition of "rational" from referring to adhering to the process of deduction or induction, the only rational processes that exist to some vague rational feeling or something.
I'll give you this: I think you have probably interpreted Coyne accurately here. On looking at this through the lens you have provided here, it does indeed seem that this is what Coyne is doing. The question is whether this is a useful or even meaningful definition of the word. I maintain that it is not. I'll extrapolate on this in another post.
And in terms of whether it is "'rational' to live one's life ... each day, based on the induction that a day will follow the present one," I think that wouldn't be completely objectionable in everyday conversation, but if you have any concern with accuracy in an intellectual discussion the term to use is "prudent." It is "prudent" to live your life this way. Prudence captures the sense of the reliance on what Hume calls "custom and tradition," which are non-rational--and perfectly acceptable--ways of knowing that scientists who pretend to be the champions of rationality often characterize as being non-rational.
Singring,
I find your backtracking on the certainty of inductive generalizations to be interesting. What does your reduced view of the strength of induction say about the laws of nature? They are based upon these generalization. Are they now just probable?
'So now we've shifted the definition of "rational" from referring to adhering to the process of deduction or induction, the only rational processes that exist to some vague rational feeling or something.'
I've never 'shifted' my position on rationality and inference and the record shows this very clearly - it was you who misquoted me to begin with.
I have also stressed time and again that the rational process as I use the word hinges not upon a 'vague feeling', but upon natural, observable, testable evidence and arguments derived from such data.
It is not me who made a claim about the nature of the universe and backed it up by saying it was 'self-evident', Martin. please remember that.
'I'll give you this: I think you have probably interpreted Coyne accurately here. '
I think Coyne represents the position of most scientists that enter the arena of debate: we don't claim to have the absolute truth (though we do claim to have some pretty good hypotheses or theries about what it may be, supported to varying degrees by the available evidence), but neither do you and that's what the whole discussion boils down to.
Making accurate semantic distinctions about what a scientist means when he says something is 'true' or not 'true' or what we 'know' and don't 'know' in conversations or even in articles is a problem, I will gladly admit that. But making that distinction is simply not practical.
Imagine a science program on Black holes: They interview an expert in the field and he says: 'We now know that there is a supermassive black hole at the centre of our Galaxy around which our solar system orbits.'
What are they supposed to do? Preface that with 'Based on a meta-analysis of published literature that resulted in a body of observational data matching the predictions of relativity theory with respect to this hyopthesis at a significance level of P < 0.05'??? Maybe put a disclaimer at the bottom of the screen giving a rundown of the reams of data that have been collected?
Of course not. They simply say 'we know' when in fact they mean 'the majority of data strongly indicates that..'. Why? Because that's the way language works.
This is what often leads to the perception that scientists are making claims to certainty that they then criticize religions for.
'The question is whether this is a useful or even meaningful definition of the word. I maintain that it is not. I'll extrapolate on this in another post.'
Now that is a discussion worth having. In fact, I believe it is the question most theist/atheist discussions boil down to, at least in my experience.
From many of your posts and also comments made by Thomas and Lee and many other theists I have encountered in the internet discussions (granted, not a representative sample) I get the impression that you (and I know I'm generalizing here) are fundamentally attached to the notion that somehow conclusions that are arrived at must be certainties.
I'm really not trying to be difficult, but virtually every time you have responded to my comments you have presented my position as if I was making absolute claims and statements of certainty. There are very few things I would claim with certainty and time and again I have tried to point this out to you.
Originally I thought it was a purposeful strategy of misleading readers, but now I think its just that we emply fundamentally different modes of language, one born from the tradition of philosophy, one from that of applied science.
'What does your reduced view of the strength of induction say about the laws of nature? They are based upon these generalization. Are they now just probable?'
Of course they are probable. Everything is probable or improbable. Can we say with certainty that there is no place in the universe at which light travels faster than it does on earth? No.
But that does not mean we can;t say that eevry shred of evidence we have ever collected indicates that this is the case.
In common parlance, I therefore would call this a 'fact' or 'true' or something 'I know'. It would not be 'rational' by hume's definition, but it would be 'rational' by my definition of making predictions based upon the ebst available evidence.
'It is "prudent" to live your life this way. Prudence captures the sense of the reliance on what Hume calls "custom and tradition," which are non-rational--and perfectly acceptable--ways of knowing that scientists who pretend to be the champions of rationality often characterize as being non-rational.'
Oh come on.
You don't base decisions about planning ahead on 'custom and tradition' - you do it because past experience has indicated that one day follows the next.
A better example:
Do you base rational decisions about which car to buy on 'custom and tradition'? No - you base them on the hard data. How reliable is the car (induction), how much mileage does it get to the gallon (induction), how long will it take me to make all the payments induction).
Hmmm...
"A deductive argument runs something like this:
All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal
It begins with a universal statement ("All men are mortal") and ends in a more particular statement ("Socrates is mortal").
Induction goes the other direction. It begins in particular observations and ends in a universal statement:
On every past day, the sun has risen in the morning
The future will always be like the past
Therefore, in every future day, the sun will rise in the morning"
Let's try something:
For as long as humans have existed, every person who has lived has died.
The future will always be like the past
Therefore, all men will die (and thus are mortal).
Since all men are mortal
And since Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal
Is it possible to frame a deductive argument that is concerned with reality so that it does not rely on exactly the sort of inductive reasoning that Martin wishes to "think away"?
It is ever so amusing to see the lengths (and depths) that some will sink once they realize that reality contradicts their theological suppositions.
Art,
Where did I "think away" inductive reasoning? I accept inductive reasoning.
So, Martin, how can your example "rational" deductive argument really be rational, since it flows from non-rational inductive reasoning?
Art,
I didn't say that inductive reasoning was not rational, I said it relies on a premise that cannot be rationally justified, but can only be justified by custom and tradition. I accept custom and tradition, even though they are not formally rational. Do you?
'I didn't say that inductive reasoning was not rational, I said it relies on a premise that cannot be rationally justified,'
And that is different from deductive reasoning how? Art made this point brilliantly.
Your deductive argument begins with 'All men are mortal'. Please justify that premise rationally, Martin.
How do you know that 'all mean are mortal', Martin? Could it not be that there is an immortal man walking the earth right at this moment? Or that there has been one in the past that we just don't know aboout?
Your house of cards has collapsed, Martin. It should be obvious even to you at this point.
EVERY premise we can come up with is based on inductive reasoning and that is precisely why science is so powerful (because it is testable against what we perceive as real) and philosophy (where it is not doing science) and especially religion are so impotent (because they base arguments on assertion rather than evidence, as you have shown time and again - for example I still have no answer as to why the universe is 'self-evidently' contingent).
Singring,
As usual, you're in over your head. The statement all men are mortal is true by definition. It's part of the essential (rather than accidental) nature of being a man that he is mortal. If he weren't mortal, he wouldn't be a man.
So now we're shifting from a discussion in which you were ignorant of Hume to a discussion in which you are ignorant of Aristotle.
If I said "all unmarried males are bachelors" would you challenge me to prove that? How about if I said "all triangles have three sides"? Do I have to go out and look at all triangles?
As in the discussion over induction, where you had a hard time making a distinction between the rational and the non-rational, now you are having a hard time making a distinction between the essential and non-essential.
You can have deductive arguments with non essential premises, but you fired at the wrong one because you don't understand the distinction. A deductive argument with a premise that is definitionally true is called a demonstrative syllogism. You would have at least made some kind of sense had you used as your example what is called a "dialectical" syllogism--one which contains a major premise that is not essentially, but only accidentally true. Something like this:
All swans are white
This is a swan
Therefore, this swan is white
This is an unsound syllogism of course because, although it was once thought that all swans were white, we have since discovered that black swans exist. It is valid, but not sound. But the major premise is not true definitionally, whiteness was never an essential feature of swans, only an accidental one. And the only way we could know that it was true was empirically.
The conclusion of a deductive argument is necessarily true given the premises. But the strength of the conclusion is dependent on the strength of the premises. So in a demonstrative syllogism, the conclusion not only necessarily follows, it is certain, just like the premises; whereas in a dialectical argument, although the conclusion necessarily follows, it is not certain, because the major premise is not certain.
But even if you had used something like this as your example, it wouldn't prove your point that deduction suffers from the same problem as induction, since the logical weakness in induction is part of the essential nature of induction: it has to have the rationally unjustified premise, otherwise it wouldn't be induction.
There's that nasty essential/accidental distinction again that we're not familiar with.
Whereas the nature of the premises in a deductive argument may be rationally strong or weak, but that doesn't affect the strength of the inference.
The nature of inductive and deductive reasoning are essentially (there's that confounded word again) different. Inductive reasoning is that from which all of our knowledge is derived. It's the material principle of all of our knowledge.
Deductive reasoning that by which all of our knowledge is demonstrated. It's the formal principle of all of our knowledge.
In fact, this issue of a premise in which it is stated that the future must be like the past is only one aspect of the problem of induction, since it is only one example of the more general way in which induction operates--moving from the material plane of sense experience to the universal plane (or back again), as opposed to deduction which operates solely on the intelligible or conceptual plan.
All of which is just to say that these two types of reasoning are entirely different in their nature, and to say that one suffers from the same problem as the other is to betray a complete misunderstanding of what they consist of.
But I'm sure, despite knowing little about how induction and deduction actually work, you'll still have a lot more to say about the issue.
'If I said "all unmarried males are bachelors" would you challenge me to prove that?'
Sigh. Of course not.
But read your own articles Martin! Weere you attacking Coyne/science based on conceptual claims they are making?
No - you attacked them based on claims they wqere making about reality. Nature. The universe.
If you are allowed to simply assert that the mortality of man is 'true by definition' (we are talking about the actual physical properties of a man now, not some conceptual definition of the word), then why can't I or Coyne or anyone else say that the fact the conclusions of inductive reasoning are 'true by definition'?
I mean, its as if I said:
''The statement 'the future will always be like the past' is true by definition. It's part of the essential (rather than accidental) nature of the future that it will always be like the past.'
Would you accept that as justification for making absolute claims about future events based on past events?
Oh - but you say you are now talking about concepts rather than reality? Then WHY did you write three screeds attacking Coyne for his 'irrationality' and unfounded 'assertions' when it is blatantly clear that he was making claims about reality - not concepts! You can't just jump back and forth between the two levels of discourse when defending your articles, when in fact they themselves do nothing but attack the real-world claims of science.
Yet now you come out and tell us that you knew all along that you are misrepresenting the core of the argument. This of course amounts to a full admission of intellectual dishonesty.
Thelast couple of paragraphs in your most recent post say it all:
'it is only one example of the more general way in which induction operates--moving from the material plane of sense experience to the universal plane (or back again), as opposed to deduction which operates solely on the intelligible or conceptual plan.
All of which is just to say that these two types of reasoning are entirely different in their nature, '
So you plainly state that you knew full well in writing the article that you were mixing the two planes of reasoning to take pot-shots at Coyne. So then I guess these three posts will be taken down soon? After all they are wholly inaccurate.
Wow. As I continue reading your latest post it just gets more and more bizarre:
'This is an unsound syllogism of course because, although it was once thought that all swans were white, we have since discovered that black swans exist. It is valid, but not sound. '
So let me get this straight:
Something is true 'by definition' as long as we have not discovered an example to the contrary? Is THAT how you arrived at the conclusion that men being mortal is 'true by definition'?
Here's a syllogism then:
All unicorns are pink
Is that to say that unicorns exist?
Oh no, you say: Because we're talking about concepts here. I get it.
But then WHY do you attack science as if it were doing conceptual reasoning when you KNOW it is not justified?
This is just ridiculous.
'But the major premise is not true definitionally, whiteness was never an essential feature of swans, only an accidental one. And the only way we could know that it was true was empirically.'
How do you make these fantastical assertions? How come 'whiteness' is not an 'essential' feature of swans, but 'mortality' is an essential feature of man? Do you get to decide which features of X are 'essential' and which are not?
These are truly bizarre realms of assertion you are drifting off into, Martin.
Singring,
I should have known better than to introduce concepts into this discussion which you clearly have clue about. I tell you what, I'll argue with you about what is essential and what is accidental when you show me that you have actually grasped what they mean. It is fairly clear from this comment that you have no idea.
So I'm waiting: tell me what it is to be essential and what it is to be accidental [Hint: it's in Aristotle's Metaphysics]
Art,
I never claimed that premises in deductive arguments were not derived from the conclusions of prior inductive arguments, so I don't get your point.
I suspect this is another misstatement of my position. Maybe you and Singring should form a club or something.
Martin - the more you patronize and the less you provide sound argumentation, the more embarassing it will be when your argument is utterly destroyed.
Here we go:
From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
'The distinction between essential versus accidental properties has been characterized in various ways, but it is currently most commonly understood in modal terms along these lines: an essential property of an object is a property that it must have while an accidental property of an object is one that it happens to have but that it could lack.'
So you say that 'whiteness' is an accidental property of a swan because a swan can also be black.
On the other hand, you give the example of a man being mortal as being an 'essential property' because a man HAS to be mortal, otherwise he is not a man.
So we are left with two options:
1.) You are simply defining the word 'man' to be such a thing that must be mortal, thus basing the premise of your argument on a mere concept (your definition of the word 'man') - I have no problem with that at all. But it does mean that your argument does not impinge on reality one iota.
or
2.) You are basing it on the real, physical object that by convention of the English language we all refer to as a 'man'. But wait - how would you know that all of these physical objects are 'mortal' (i.e. cease biological functions at some stage)?
I'll give you a hint this time:
It starts with a 'i' and ends in 'nduction'.
This is exactly the point Art was making in response to the other post.
You are either talking about 'rationality' only applying to concepts, or you are talking about 'rationality' as it applies to real, physical objects and are therefore basing it on induction like everybody else.
You simply cannot have it both ways, Martin.
Singring,
I actually think I'm going to agree with you here--at least partially--and not for the reasons you give. After reflecting on this after I posted it, I realized that mortality cannot be an essential aspect of humanity, since Adam was not originally mortal, but he was a man. Furthermore, once resurrected, man is no longer mortal, but he is still man Therefore, it mortality must be accidental in humans.
I'm glad to move over to your position on this.
But I have gone back and read your original comment again, where you ask whether the premise "all men are mortal" can be rationally justified. I think you are thinking that if the premise is based on induction, and induction is not a rational process, then the statement "all men are mortal" cannot itself be rationally justified, and in turn, the deductive argument in which it appears cannot be rationally justified.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that is your argument.
There are several problems with this argument. The first is that it ignores what I said about deductive reasoning staying on the conceptual plane. The statement "all men are mortal" is not making a material assertion--it is not saying anything about the existence of men. It is saying that everything that is within the category of "men" (whether they exist or not) is mortal.
If it were the case universal affirmative statements like this necessarily relied on prior inductions, then you would have to say that the statement "all unicorns have horns" relies on a prior induction, which it clearly does not.
Even the modern logicians, with whom I disagree on a lot of things, don't think that universal statements ("all S is P", "no S is P") have what is called "existential import"--in other words, that they imply the existence of the subject. They only go so far as to say that particular statements ("some S is P" and "some S is not P") imply the existence of their subjects.
But let's go back to Arts original question, which was a perfectly fair one:
Is it possible to frame a deductive argument that is concerned with reality so that it does not rely on exactly the sort of inductive reasoning that Martin wishes to "think away"?
Well, for one thing, the question assumes I want to "think away" or reject induction, which is a mischaracterization of what I said. But the answer to the question is "no," since deductive arguments can (in dialectical forms of deductions) rely on premises from inductive ones and, although that affects the certainty of the conclusion (as I pointed out before in my distinction between demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms), the certainty of the conclusion is a completely different issue than the certainty of the inference.
Whether a premise relies on a prior induction or not, it has no affect on the deductive inference--only on the certainty of the conclusion. But again, I was not questioning the strength of inductive inference. I was pointing out that its basis was not strictly rational, but was based on custom and tradition--something I don't have a problem with, but the people who commonly try to argue that there is something wrong with these things as a basis for belief should.
As to your question,
But then WHY do you attack science as if it were doing conceptual reasoning when you KNOW it is not justified?
I don't know what you're talking about. Maybe you could elaborate.
'Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that is your argument.'
You got it right.
'I don't know what you're talking about. Maybe you could elaborate.'
I will:
Your latest post is the most informative and most pertinent one on the issue you have written to date and it clarifies all the points myself and Art (I believe) were trying to make.
First, you admit that when you are making a deductive argument using the premise 'all men are mortal', you are talking about a concept - not reality. I quote:
'The first is that it ignores what I said about deductive reasoning staying on the conceptual plane. The statement "all men are mortal" is not making a material assertion--it is not saying anything about the existence of men. '
This is precisely the point. You are talking about concepts when you are talking about 'rational arguments', whereas Coyne is talking about reality. You apprently were fully aware of this when you were writing your articles on him, which is why I have to wonder what their point was?
Coyne is not talking about the power of science to derive 'rational' (your and Hume's useage) conclusions about concepts, he is talking about the power of science to make 'rational' (his and my usage) predictions and statements about reality.
As Art said - you are welcome to engage in arguemnts based on concepts if that makes you happy and that's what you think is important. But I would really hope that you do not write articles attacking science or scientists knwoing full well that the only gripe you have with them is their usage of the word 'rational'.
OPne paragrpah would have made that point nicely. Three articles ripping into everything from science in general to Coyne in particular that make it sound as if science was a completey baseless and arbitrary process is not exactly justified. That's what I was getting at.
'I was pointing out that its basis was not strictly rational, but was based on custom and tradition--something I don't have a problem with, but the people who commonly try to argue that there is something wrong with these things as a basis for belief should.'
No, Martin. In sience it is not based on 'custom and tradition' it is based on observational data and empirical evidence. It has little to do with custom and tradition - in fact science is all about challenging custom and tradition.
The last thing on earth any scientist worth his credentials would say is: 'Yeah, I believe X is true because that's the tradition'. If that were the case, there would be no Galileo, no Newton, no Darwin, no Einstein.
THAT'S why science is fundamentally different from religion.
There is nothing wrong debating facyful concepts in philosophy and religion - but when you are trying to make accurate statements about reality, its only science that can do the job as far as we know.
You have illsustrated this point yourself very nicely. Every argument about reality hinges upon induction - in other words, it hinges upon science. And so far, virtually every claim ever made by any religion has failed the scientific test and thereby is very unlikely to be real. That is the point Coyne was making.
Singring,
So concepts aren't real?
Singring,
And are you saying that inductive arguments do not rely on concepts?
'So concepts aren't real?'
How do you define 'real'?
A concept is the 'real' product of physical processes in the brain. No brain, no concepts. So you could say that concepts are real by proxy, yes. But just because the generation of 'concepts' in the rbain is real does not mean that every concept is real, does it.
I am right now thinking of a three-headed troll with red shoes. The processes in my brain that are making me generate and perceive that idea are real, but the concept itself is of course not real - at least iof you stick to common definitions of physical reality (or 'nature') and concepts.
We can gauge whetehr or not a concept is 'real' by whether or not we can find any physical, natural evidence that it actually exists. That is called 'science'.
Are you now trying to tell me that all concepts have a physical reality?
'And are you saying that inductive arguments do not rely on concepts?'
Of course they do (at least to a large extent). Ultimately every word we use is a concept.
But in science we rely on concepts that can be validated to have a physical existence independent of the concept generated and perceived in our brain. Can we ever be certain that these thinsg are actually physically real? Can I ever be certain that the chair I am sitting on has a physical reality (in the same way my body has a physical reality)? No. But since there is not a single shred of an indication to think this is not the case, why should I not think that observation and empirical evidence can give me a very good indication of what is physically real and what is not.
But all this is not the point of the argument, Martin.
The argument is about whether or not anyone can make any claims about reality without relying to some degree on inference from physical evidence or past experience. It simply can't be done. When 'concepts' are being used in that context, they are only used so far as they can be corroborated by evidence.
For example, let's take the premise 'all men have blue skin'.
When you make that premise for your deductive argument, you clearly admitted that you are talking about the 'concept' of a man wholly removed from reality - in other words you can define such a concept in absolute terms. 'All conceptual men have blue skin' - 'Why?' - 'Because I define conceptual men to be so.'
That's a perfectly sound way of going about things, but all it does is give you conclusions about concepts. How can you find out how likely it is that these concepts have a physically real pendant?
Induction. Science.
You go out and you do research. How many men actually HAVE blue skin? Not too many, I'd wager. So we have to reject that premise. A premise that we have no way of validating conceptually.
Let's look at this permise:
'All bird have feathers'
If you can make an argument based wholly on the conceptual plain to support this argument, I'd be very impressed, Martin.
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