This is the image that came to mind seeing the most recent exchange between atheist biologist Jerry Coyne (the eight year-old in this saga) and Christian philosopher Edward Feser. Jerry rushes at Ed, all arms flailing, Ed holds hand out, stopping the charge, calmly pointing out to Jerry that his facts are wrong, his arguments are invalid, that he is completely missing the point, or that he has failed to make a crucial distinction, at which point Jerry, in seeming ignorance of the points Ed has made, just keeps repeating the same futile procedure over and over and over again.
But if you can't appreciate his logic (and he makes it very difficult), you at least gotta admire his spunk.
In the most recent episode, the issue is whether there could have been a literal Adam and Eve. It is a debate, Christianity Today magazine asserted, that constitutes "a groundbreaking science-and-Scripture dispute, a 21st-century equivalent of the once disturbing proof that the Earth orbits the sun." While it is not quite equivalent to the issue of whether Jesus actually rose from the dead, a literal claim without which there would literally be no Christianity, the Apostle Paul does clearly assume a literal Adam, making it a truth claim the disproof of which would seriously cripple the philosophical and theological integrity of Christianity, particularly the doctrine of original sin, which asserts that, in the words of the old New England Primer, "In Adam's fall, we fell all."
There are Christians, of course, who try to fudge on this issue, claiming that one could believe in a figurative Adam and Eve (i.e., that Paul was mistaken) and still be an orthodox Christian. Former head of the Human Genome Project Francis Collins and his colleague Karl Giberson attempt this position. But it's not a terribly convincing.
The Catholic Church has long taken the position that the origin of the human body--whether it comes from "pre-existent and living matter"--is not the material issue. One can take the position that the human body was the result of biological development as long as one did not deny that "souls are immediately created by God." Leo XII's statement on this issue in his encyclical Humani Generis also states that polygenism (that we are descended from multiple parents rather than one particular set) is not a belief that is reconcilable with orthodox Christianity. In addition, he said, such a belief would conflict with the belief in original sin.
Protestants are not limited by any particular theological authority other than their own personal interpretive inclinations, a fact that has resulted in a riot of diverse schools of thought on such issues, but the Catholic teaching is clear and unambiguous. We are descended from two original human parents. So the questioning of this dogma is important indeed.
Enter Coyne, who declared recently on his blog, "[T]he scientific evidence shows that Adam and Eve could not have existed, at least in the way they’re portrayed in the Bible."
And, lest his assertion was not clear, he added, "Unlike the case of Jesus’s virgin birth and resurrection, we can dismiss a physical Adam and Eve with near scientific certainty."
And, just in case there was still any doubt about what he meant, he concluded, "[T]he genetic data show unequivocally that humanity did not descend from a single pair that lived in the genus Homo."
Coyne tries to base his claim on genetic research that ironically derives in part from the person whose appointment to head the Human Genome Project he adamantly opposed on the grounds that he was an evangelical Christian: Francis Collins. Collins wrote, in a 2006 book, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, that, as Christianity Today put it, "humans emerged from primate ancestors perhaps 100,000 years ago—long before the apparent Genesis time frame—and originated with a population that numbered something like 10,000, not two individuals."
Richard Ostling, writing in Christianity Today, recounts the position of Dennis R. Venema, a biology chairman at Trinity Western University and a fellow at Biologos, an organization with which Coyne has shown little but scorn because of their "accommodationist" (i.e., that science and religion are consistent approaches to truth):
Over the past decade, researchers have attempted to use the genetic diversity within modern humans to estimate primordial population sizes. According to a consensus drawn from three independent avenues of research, he states, the history of human ancestry involved a population "bottleneck" around 150,000 years ago—and from this tiny group of hominids came everyone living today. But the size of the group was far larger than a lonely couple: it consisted of several thousand individuals at minimum, say the geneticists.So Coyne, armed with evidence uncovered in part by an evangelical Christian who only several years earlier he proclaimed could not be trusted on such issues--and flailing away, announces that there were no Adam and Eve. Coyne then goes on to catalog various evangelical rationalizations of the problem, all of which he finds wanting, at which point he does his end zone dance.
But it was all effective enough to convince John Farrell to write a piece in Forbes magazine where he unaccountably finds Coyne convincing on this issue, quotes him, and expands on Coyne's points (misstating the Eastern Orthodox view on original sin in the process), and challenging the Catholic Church to renounce its "silence" on the "challenge of genomics."
Apparently the continuous public witness of the Church over the course of centuries to the truth of the Aristotelian-Thomist position, which articulates a full view of man as a physical and spiritual creature that bears only partial resemblance to the being Farrell, Coyne and others discuss in their arguments, and making clear public statements which are easily available to anyone who is serious about wanting to know the Church's position are just not sufficient.
Despite this, Coyne accuses theists "of rationalizing, post facto, hopes and ideas that one pulls out of thin air." Statements like this serve as atheist like a sort of spell to keep .
But just in case anyone needed to be reminded, Catholic philosopher Ed Feser enters the fray. Feser, who is fast becoming the go-to guy when it comes to defending the Ancient Faith against its less than intellectually impressive detractors (and who you can just imagine sighing once again and shaking his head), then pointed out a few uncomfortable facts to Jerry (and John), among which is that, in his post on this issue, Coyne didn't even bother taking into account the view of the Christian institution that has been around the longest, an institution that has made an implicit distinction between the concept of homo sapiens as a biological category and the concept of rational animals as a physical and theological category.
In other words, the biological condition of homo sapiens is a necessary condition for being a humans as we know them now, but it is not sufficient. The philosophical distinction of man as a "rational animal" (Aristotle's definition) is also necessary to the full definition of human being. Men are indeed homo sapiens, biologically speaking. But they are something far more than this: they are creatures who can apprehend abstract concepts in a way in which other animals do not even remotely approximate. He points in his response to an article by Kenneth W. Kemp ("Science, Theology, and Monogenesis"), which goes into gory detail about the Catholic position on this and why it is completely consistence with a bottleneck of however many thousand homo sapiens.
But Coyne, who apparently didn't actually read Feser's article but someone else's summary, does what he seems to do every time he has to deal with Feser: he fires wildly while running for cover. In this case, he criticizes Feser using an argument that Kemp's article, to which Feser had linked to, had already refuted--and then goes and hides behind Jason Rosenhouse. "I needn’t go over all the problems that Jason finds with this."
Yeah. Right.
It's hard work acting as second for someone who, every time he show up for the duel, runs off, but Rosenhouse, a mathematician who blogs at EvolutionBlog, holds forth manfully. But Rosenhouse seems to have no better ability to manage careful distinctions than Coyne.
He argues first that "the Bible does not teach anything remotely like what Feser is describing." Rosenhouse manages this criticism by assuming that Feser is somehow obligated to give Genesis a fundamentalist reading, which it is kind of hard for Feser to do since, like, he's a Catholic. As Feser himself pointed out, while it would be very convenient for atheists if all Christians took a fundamentalist position, they probably need to get used to the fact that all Christians are not fundamentalists, and that it would probably help their case (not to mention make for a more productive discussion) to actually address the arguments of Christians who, like Feser, don't match up with the stereotypes atheists are always invoking.
Rosenhouse then questions Feser's point that human being are not exhausted by their physical attributes, to which Rosenhouse responds, "we should note that Catholic theologians have not the slightest basis for saying that our nature is simply not exhausted by our physical attributes." Back to Feser:
Hear that? Not “a highly controversial basis.” Not “a basis that I, Jason Rosenhouse, find unconvincing.” No, not the slightest basis. Now, forget about my own arguments for the intellect’s immateriality (though Rosenhouse says nothing in response to them). A great many more important Catholic philosophers and theologians have also presented serious arguments for it, as have non-Catholic Christians and pagan thinkers in the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. Secular writers like Karl Popper and David Chalmers have endorsed forms of dualism. Secular writers like Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer, and Galen Strawson, while they do not embrace dualism, nevertheless reject physicalism. Yet others, like Thomas Nagel, Jerry Fodor, and Joseph Levine, have argued that there are at least serious difficulties facing physicalism which have yet to be answered. And many materialists who think these difficulties can be answered at least acknowledge that the difficulties are indeed serious ones raised by critics in good faith. Then there are secular non-dualists like Tyler Burge, John Searle, and William Lycan, who (as I have noted before) have expressed the opinion that the dominance of materialism in contemporary philosophy of mind owes less to the quality of the arguments in its favor than to ideological thinking.In other words, let's all pretend that these argument have never been made so we can go on arguing with our fundamentalist caricatures.
But for Rosenhouse, it seems, none of these thinkers has the slightest basis for his views. It’s all just transparently feeble religious apologetics, apparently even with the many secularists among them. No doubt that’s because Rosenhouse read a materialist philosophy of mind book once back in college which he thinks “refuted” all the objections to materialism once and for all.
Finally, Rosenhouse says, "Intelligence and rationality appear to be things that come in degrees." He then goes on to list all the intelligent qualities animals have the men also possess, all of which are apparently supposed to add up to the qualities that men have that animals do not possess, namely, as Feser points out, "conceptual thought" that "can have a determinate, unambiguous content and a universality of reference that sensations, mental imagery, and material symbols cannot have even in principle."
Rosenhouse says that Feser's account "creates some very difficult theological problems." The problem is that none of the "theological problems" Rosenhouse identifies are actually theological problems. In fact, all they amount to is Rosenhouse saying that he doesn't understand why God would have done it that way. So saying you don't understand someone's motivations for doing something some kind of refutation of the fact that they did it?
"Also," Rosenhouse adds, "the idea of a Chosen People is itself theologically problematic. Among Jews, a very common understanding of the notion is that the Jews are unique only in their willingness to accept a covenant with God. Which is to say, it is the Jews who chose God and not the other way around." Wait, Rosenhouse was only just earlier seen arguing that Feser wasn't following the Biblical account, and now Rosenhouse is arguing this? One thing that comes through loud and clear in those accounts is that the covenant is completely unilateral in its initiation. Maybe Rosenhouse could explain how he derives Abraham's willingness out of the Biblical accounts which don't mention what Abraham thought about it at all.
Memo to New Atheists: Don't debate Feser. Go back to your caracatures. And theists? They don't need caricatures. They've got Rosenhouse and Coyne.
46 comments:
'In other words, the biological condition of homo sapiens is a necessary condition for being a humans as we know them now, but it is not sufficient. The philosophical distinction of man as a "rational animal" (Aristotle's definition) is also necessary to the full definition of human being. Men are indeed homo sapiens, biologically speaking. But they are something far more than this: they are creatures who can apprehend abstract concepts in a way in which other animals do not even remotely approximate.'
Interesting. You are implying that there existed Homo sapiens that did not have the ability apprehend abstract concepts. This is very much a claim about the physical world. So what is your evidence that this was so? What is your evidence that a population of Homo sapiens existed that had no such cognitive abilities and that two individuals from such a population were picked by God to be infused with souls on day X?
Also, how does the fact that primates have the ability to apprehend abstract concepts, for example words and language or physical principles, such as that certain objects float? (watch this rather rmearkable video for an example:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yrPb41hzYdw
'Secular writers like Karl Popper and David Chalmers have endorsed forms of dualism. Secular writers like Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer, and Galen Strawson, while they do not embrace dualism, nevertheless reject physicalism.'
Martin, it doesn't matter how many 'writers' of 'philosophers' believe in dualism. That's simply an argument from popularity. Very shoddy logic indeed.
If you want to propose a dualistic model to account for humanity's capacity for abstract thought, then you should provide evidence for that position. You know - published studies, observational data etc.
When we actually look at the studies that have been published, however, we find that various cognitive abilities are directly and inextricably linked to discrete physical areas of the brain. Or do you dispute that?
So then, what is your basis to propuse dualism?
'But for Rosenhouse, it seems, none of these thinkers has the slightest basis for his views.'
So prove him wrong then. Give us the evidence.
Of course you don't do that - instead you just call those who want evidence 'materialists' as if that in any way represented a positive argument in favour of your view. Of course, if you are ready to accept non-materialistic arguments for dualism, then anything goes. Why not quadrupalism? Pentalism? Infinitism?
Such is the problem with metraphysics: Once you choose convenient starting premises, then anything can be 'proven'.
'In other words, let's all pretend that these argument have never been made so we can go on arguing with our fundamentalist caricatures.'
It's not a matter of what arguments have been made - it's a matter of how well they are supported by empirical data. I can come up with a lovely metaphysical theory about how we're all posessed by spirits that are misleading us about reality and that the world really consists of marshmallows. But where is the evidence that this proposition is in fact true?
You seem to be perfectly happy to pick the argument you like best from a pile of metaphysical claptrap and then just ignore anyone who actually would like to know why your favoured argument is any better than the rest of the pile when it comes to explaining the goings on in actual, physical reality. Maybe that kind of random choice modus operandi satisfies your intellectual requirements - but don't expect atheists to be as easily placated.
Martin,
There is evidence that species of human other than homo sapien sapiens engaged in ceremonial burials, and cared for their invalid elderly, and that Neanderthals could speak. They also understood the concept of hand axe, as they had to select the correct type of rock and skillfully work it to create a sophisticated tool with a very sharpe edge. How does this square with the Catholic concept discussed by Feser in his article?
KyCobb,
The traditional definition used by Catholics (and philosophers going back to Aristotle) of "human" is "rational animal." Tool using (as far as I can see) does not constitute rationality. It seems to connote intelligence, but intelligence is a broad category which need not encompass rationality.
So using a hand axe is not ipso facto evidence of a creature's humanity. I see no reason there could not be intelligent creatures--like Edgar Rice Burrough's (or H. G. Well's) Martians, or (as I hear--I haven't seen it) the apes in the Rise of the Planet of the Apes, who are intellegent, but not human.
The ability to use tools is not a sufficient condition for being human.
These are creatures who may use tools, but then cannot conceptually apprehend the true and the good and articulate it--as creature do who have human souls.
Nor is language use, depending on what you mean by the term, a sufficient condition for humanity. You hear a lot of claims about animals speaking, but it never seems to amount to the conceptual kind of speech used by humans. Many animals communicate, so I suppose you could call what they do "language," but that does't mean its the kind of language humans use. But present your evidence if you like.
That all being said, if there were a creature (say, a neanderthal) who used conceptual language of the kind unique to rational animals, then he would be human metaphysically speaking, however you categorize him biologically.
By the way, concerning the relationship between intelligence and rationality, it seems to me that, while rationality implies intelligence, intelligence does not imply rationality.
And one more thing. I'm not sure Well's Martians would really do for my example here or not. I better stick with Burrough's Martians.
Singring,
What is your evidence that a population of Homo sapiens existed that had no such cognitive abilities and that two individuals from such a population were picked by God to be infused with souls on day X?
Once again, you don't seem to recognize the distinction between a proof (which I made no attempt to make) and a refutation (which I was recounting Feser making).
You seem to think that when someone says, "There is no possibility that there was an Adam and Eve," which is essentially what Coyne said, it is somehow his job to prove that there was necessarily an Adam and Eve. In fact, the only thing you have to do to prove the original statement false is show that it is not impossible that there was an Adam and Eve.
When you're refuting someone who says something is impossible, you don't have to show that it is necessary: you only have to show it is possible.
In this case, all that is required is to describe a scenario in which the genetic conclusion could be accepted and there still be an Adam and Eve from which we are all descended.
This is what Feser and Kemp have done. And that's all they need to do to disprove Coyne's universal claim.
Martin,
There has been a heated debate about whether or not Neanderthals had language or not:
http://sjohn30.tripod.com/id1.html
The Neanderthal hyoid bone, which connects to the muscles of the jaw, larynx and tongue, is virtually identical to ours, suggesting that Neanderthals were capable of complex language. Their brains were, on average, slightly larger than ours, and DNA analysis shows that Eurasian people have some Neanderthal ancestors.
"These are creatures who may use tools, but then cannot conceptually apprehend the true and the good and articulate it--as creature do who have human souls."
The fossil of an old man with only one tooth was found in the Republic of Georgia. He was a Homo Erectus with a much smaller brain than ours, and he lived 1.8 million years ago. His tooth sockets had grown over, showing he lived without his teeth for at least a couple of years, which strongly suggests that his kin provided for him. Is that not good?
Martin,
"That all being said, if there were a creature (say, a neanderthal) who used conceptual language of the kind unique to rational animals, then he would be human metaphysically speaking, however you categorize him biologically."
Does that mean that, for a Catholic, Adam and Eve could have been the common ancestor of both us and Neanderthals, and therefore not homo sapien sapiens? Since Catholics believe in original sin, what was that sin? Was it the literal violation of God's command not to eat the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil in the Garden of Eden? And if not, what was the original sin?
KyCobb,
Is it good that an old homo erectus was taken care of by his kin? Uh, let's see ... Yes. And it's very touching too, although I'm not sure you can conclude this from the fact that he had not teeth. But as I recall there's also evidence of inter-social violence among hominids, so I'm not sure what that all means.
But I don't see how that and Europeans having Neanderthal ancestors militates against Feser and Kemp's thesis. That is precisely what Kemp says might have happened: humans (ensouled rational animals) breeding with non-humans who were biologically, but not metaphysically, similar.
KyCobb,
Does that mean that, for a Catholic, Adam and Eve could have been the common ancestor of both us and Neanderthals, and therefore not homo sapien sapiens?
I don't see why this would be. Maybe you could explain.
KyCobb,
Since Catholics believe in original sin, what was that sin? Was it the literal violation of God's command not to eat the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil in the Garden of Eden? And if not, what was the original sin?
The sin was disobedience to God either by a literal partaking of the fruit of a literal tree, or by the performance of some act allegorized by the figure of the eating of the fruit of the tree. As far as I know, I don't think a Catholic is obligated either way.
Singring,
Also, how does the fact that primates have the ability to apprehend abstract concepts, for example words and language or physical principles, such as that certain objects float?
Please explain to me what aspect of what the primate in the video indicates it can apprehend abstract concepts. As far as I can see it does nothing that is not purely technical. You seem to assume that technical wherewithal somehow constitutes evidence of abstract conception. Maybe you could provide some kind of backing for that.
Singring,
Martin, it doesn't matter how many 'writers' of 'philosophers' believe in dualism. That's simply an argument from popularity. Very shoddy logic indeed.
You're quoting Feser here, not me. Very shoddy attribution indeed.
But you judge something by whether it achieves its purpose, and Feser's purpose here is merely to show all the sources which Rosenhouse failed to take into account when he made the claim he did.
If you want to propose a dualistic model to account for humanity's capacity for abstract thought, then you should provide evidence for that position. You know - published studies, observational data etc.
Sorry, I don't know what you'r talking about. Where did I propose a dualistic model? If you are refering to my believe that man is both biological and spiritual (or mental, if you prefer), then I can just point to myself. I am a biological, but also a conscious being. But the biology and mental aspects of my being are united in an organic whole which is not dualistic.
If you are questioning this, then which do you deny? Your biological qualities or your mental qualities?
When we actually look at the studies that have been published, however, we find that various cognitive abilities are directly and inextricably linked to discrete physical areas of the brain. Or do you dispute that?
So you're arguing that because we can identify chemical reactions in particular parts of the brain that occur simultaneously with certain thoughts that therefore the thoughts are the chemical processes in those parts of the brain?
I don't deny the evidence, I deny your inference. Maybe you could justify it.
'Once again, you don't seem to recognize the distinction between a proof (which I made no attempt to make) and a refutation (which I was recounting Feser making).'
So you admit then that your and Feser's belief that humans were infused with a rational soul and some point in the past (which I must assume you both hold as traditinal Catholics) is no more than that - a mere assertion?
'You seem to think that when someone says, "There is no possibility that there was an Adam and Eve," which is essentially what Coyne said, it is somehow his job to prove that there was necessarily an Adam and Eve.'
No, not at all. I am perfectly aware that a refutation of a positive argument does not represent a positive assertion in return - that's the whole point of atheism after all, wouldn't you agree?
However, your post title and the entire tone of your piece as well as your and Feser's commitment to Catholicism strongly imply that you very much believe that Adam and Eve were real (maybe you don't - again you are free to correct me on this). However, your statment above seems to indicate you are aware that this belief does not meet the most rudimentary requirements for evidentiary support. Which is fine. You hold a position for which you know you currently have no evidence at all. You're perfectly free to do so as long as you fairly acknowledge the lacking rational justification of that belief.
'Please explain to me what aspect of what the primate in the video indicates it can apprehend abstract concepts.As far as I can see it does nothing that is not purely technical. You seem to assume that technical wherewithal somehow constitutes evidence of abstract conception.'
Martin, what is your definition of an 'abstract concept'?
As I understand it, abstarct reasoning means that an agent can conceptualize elements of the physical world in his mind so he can artificially manipulate them or recombine them etc. in his mind. For example, a car mechnanic who sees that the belt on a car motor has broken can form the concept of the motor in his mind, combine it with the concept of a stocking and thus form the concept that the stocking will replace the belt - thereby reasoning on a conceptual level.
In the video, the chimpanzee sees and examines the tube and the peanut and realizes he cannot reach the peanut directly. He then *leaves* the tube and the peanut to get some water. This means he must have come up with the idea of using the water to make the peanut float up while he was examining tube and peanut. In other words, he had the abstract concept of water going into the tube and raising the peanut before he even went to get the water.
There are many other examples of apes reasoning. For example, a recent much published example is that of a chimpanzee in a Swedish zoo who collected stones in the evening so he had them ready the next morning to throw at visitors. This means he had an abstract concept of the future and what he would do in the future in his mind. Simply said, he was making plans.
Read here:
http://scienceblogs.com/notrocketscience/2009/03/chimpanzee_collects_ammo_for_premeditated_tourist-stoning.php
Now, if these are not examples of 'abstract reasoning', then please tell me what you do consider abstarct reasoning.
'If you are refering to my believe that man is both biological and spiritual (or mental, if you prefer), then I can just point to myself. I am a biological, but also a conscious being.'
Just rephrasing the assertion is not evidence, Martin.
What is your evidence that your consciousness is sepearte from your biology? As I have pointed out, science seems to point the exact other way.
'But the biology and mental aspects of my being are united in an organic whole which is not dualistic.'
Oh. So you have no 'mind' or 'soul' that is not dependent on the biological processes in your body? I'll make a note of that.
'So you're arguing that because we can identify chemical reactions in particular parts of the brain that occur simultaneously with certain thoughts that therefore the thoughts are the chemical processes in those parts of the brain?'
Martin, please catch up on the science. We are not just talking about simultaneous occurrences, we are talking about mental processes that can be deliberatey, specifically and in many cases temporarily be modified in very particular ways by mdeication, magnetic fields etc. So we can very directly test and establish that when we manipulate a region of the brain in a certain way, what the person perceives or feels or reasons can be changed in a defined, predictable way. Moreover, if certain areas of the brain are destroyed, those reasoning abilities are lost. Now, all of this doesn't prove that the mind is predicated on the material world - but it certainly would indicate so, since all of this empirical evidence is explained quite easily if we assume that the mind is of the material world. There is no supernatural or 'spiritual' component required to explain the evidence, so, like all unnecessary assumptions, it can be discarded.
So your reduction of neuroscientific findings to simple correlations is very inaccurate indeed and if you write posts complaining about the misrepresentation of Catholic dogma, then I think you ought to do a better job of representing science, even if it has the unfortunate consequence of undermining your beliefs.
Singring said...
Oh. So you have no 'mind' or 'soul' that is not dependent on the biological processes in your body? I'll make a note of that.
Feser (and I believe matin Cothran as well) accept a concept of hylomorphic dualism. The soul is a form, and can't be separated from the matter it forms until death.
There are certainly problems with this position (for example, it's difficult to reconcile with the notion that concepts can not be appreciated by animal souls), but the problem of mind-brain interaction is not among them.
Martin Cothran said...
Sorry, I don't know what you'r talking about. Where did I propose a dualistic model?
Your model is not dualistic in the sense of Cartesian dualism (there is no ghost riding along in the brain), but it is dualistic in the sense of having two interacting modes of existence (the concrete and the abstrct).
Martin,
"I don't see why this would be. Maybe you could explain."
You said that a hypothetical Neanderthal, " who used conceptual language of the kind unique to rational animals, then he would be human metaphysically speaking". As I understand Feser, this would necessarily mean Neanderthals had souls created by God. I also thought that Catholic belief required that all humans are descended from Adam and Eve. So if Neanderthals were metaphysically human, would that not mean that they should be descended from Adam and Eve, so rather than Adam and Eve being homo sapien sapiens, they could be the last common ancestors of both us and Neanderthals, living roughly 700,000 years ago.
Martin,
"The sin was disobedience to God either by a literal partaking of the fruit of a literal tree, or by the performance of some act allegorized by the figure of the eating of the fruit of the tree. As far as I know, I don't think a Catholic is obligated either way."
It seems like the difference could be important, because if the Genesis story was literally true, then God set Adam and Eve up in the ultimate Catch-22. If Adam and Eve literally didn't know the difference between right and wrong before they ate the fruit, then they didn't know it was wrong to disobey God.* Thus God set them up by allowing the serpent to talk Eve into eating the fruit, and punished them even though they lacked the capacity to form an evil intent. This story makes God look pretty nasty, so I was wondering if Catholic theology deals with that issue.
*If Adam and Eve did know disobeying God was wrong, then the story falls apart, because they didn't need to eat the magic fruit to obtain the knowledge of good and evil.
> Thus God set them up by allowing the serpent to talk Eve into eating the fruit, and punished them even though they lacked the capacity to form an evil intent.
Good question. I can't speak to the Catholic understanding of this, would enjoy hearing Martin's explanation.
The problem may be semantic in nature. What does "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil" mean?
Does it mean that you cannot know something is wrong before you eat of it? That seems to be your take.
On the other hand, even dogs seem to know when they done something wrong, i.e., something that displeases their masters. My guess is that Adam and Eve understood that eating from that tree, having been forbidden to do it, would displease God.
But they would not necessarily have known why. Maybe it's the "why" part that the tree supplied...?
KyCobb,
If Adam and Eve literally didn't know the difference between right and wrong before they ate the fruit, then they didn't know it was wrong to disobey God.
I think it is too strong to say that they didn't know the difference between right and wrong. He was a rational animal, and so would have the capacity to make that distinction.
In regard to their actual state, St. Augustine puts it this way: Before the fall, men are able to sin and able not to sin; after the fall, able to sin but unable not to sin (non posse non peccare).
KyCobb,
So if Neanderthals were metaphysically human, would that not mean that they should be descended from Adam and Eve, so rather than Adam and Eve being homo sapien sapiens, they could be the last common ancestors of both us and Neanderthals, living roughly 700,000 years ago.
If there were a Neanderthals who were rational animals, then they would be human, since that is the definition of a rational animal. Practically speaking, I don't think this is possible because, as Feser and Kemp have pointed out, there appears to be some state of biological advancement necessary in order that the rationality be able to express itself, and there would be a question as to whether Neanderthals had achieved that state biologically.
But again, what wouldn't necessarily preclude a rational animal mating with a non-rational animal and producing a rational animal, which is what Feser and Kemp's account would also require in order to comply with the current genetic theories.
Singring,
As I understand it, abstarct reasoning means that an agent can conceptualize elements of the physical world in his mind so he can artificially manipulate them or recombine them etc.
Computers can manipulate and recombine, but they don't conceptualize, so obviously manipulation and recombination are not sufficient to prove conceptualization.
Feser (and I believe matin Cothran as well) accept a concept of hylomorphic dualism. The soul is a form, and can't be separated from the matter it forms until death.
OneBrow is correct here. When I said my view wasn't dualistic, I simply meant that we're not talking about some kind of Cartesian dualism (the sense in which the term is now used) of the ghost in the machine kind. We're talking about two fundamental aspects of a thing that can be distinguished but not separated in an organic unity.
'Computers can manipulate and recombine, but they don't conceptualize, so obviously manipulation and recombination are not sufficient to prove conceptualization.'
1.) Why are you not giving us a definition of 'abstract concepts', Martin? You claimed it was what made us humen - a bold claim, so its just the more disppointing to find that you are hesitant to even define the term, let alone defend the claim.
2.) I was specifically referring to the manipulation and recombination of concepts, I was not claiming they are evidence of conceptualization.
The ape in the video was not manipulating the tube, the peanut or water when he was at the tube and he left the tube before he had even touched the water, which apparently was several steps away, but which he went to get quite directedly. The conclusion is obvious: He conceptualized tube and peanut and combined it with the concept of water that wasn't even present in the problem he was initially presented with. Please respond to this and explain why it is not an example of the ape using 'abstract concepts' to get at the peanut.
And what about the chimpanzee in Sweden? He gatehred rocks and put them aside for later use, in the absence of his intended target. So clearly he had the concept of humans in his mind and how he would lob rocks at them in his mind by ways of planning his actions when he was gathering rocks.
Do you disagree? if so, why?
Remember, you made the claim that 'abstract conception' is the significant difference that separates us from the apes. At the very least you should be able to tell us why abstract conception is and then explain to us why that definition does not apply to the apes in the examples given. Otherwise, your claim will remain just what it is: a completely unfounded and arbitrary assertion simply designed to shift the goalposts indefinitely as to the definition of 'humans'.
Hardly satisfactory, I would think.
'OneBrow is correct here. When I said my view wasn't dualistic, I simply meant that we're not talking about some kind of Cartesian dualism (the sense in which the term is now used) of the ghost in the machine kind. We're talking about two fundamental aspects of a thing that can be distinguished but not separated in an organic unity.'
Then I apologize for any mischaracterization of your position, of course.
But to be honest, not only is this unintelligeble to my ears (how is something that can be 'distinguished' but is 'not separable' any different from a purely materialistsic view of the mind?) this simply kicks the problem a few yards down the road, because (in my an many other's opinion) not only is there no reason to think 'forms' in the Aristotelean sense exist (we have discussed this before of course), but the question also is how and by what mechanism this 'form' persists once the body is dead and gone and how it could possibly carry the character, personality or memories of a person into some supernatural realm like heaven or hell. This more or less raises exactly the same issues as Cartesian dualism in that materialistsic explanations of what happens at and after death sufficiently account for the data and do not require additonal supernatural explanations.
So while you and Ed Feser can merrily assert these things, they are about as credible and valid as any number of competing metaphysical assertions.
[H]ow is something that can be 'distinguished' but is 'not separable' any different from a purely materialistsic view of the mind?
In a materialist view of things distinction isn't even possible, since it is an abstract procedure that is non-material.
Singring,
You seem to be correct that the apes in question do engage coneptualization, but I believe that Feser/Cothran would demand is a specific sort of concfeptualization: the ability to separate the idea of being X from individuals cases of X. Does the first chimpanzee have a notion of "water" or "peanut" not specifically tied to an individual instance of water or nut? While I would say "yes, in a primitive fashion", Feser and Cothran would say "no". Proof has been slow in coming, although the progress with ape languages may help us find an answer in the next 20-50 years.
I fully agree that hylemorhic dualism creates a wide range of issues, but it's important to not confuse those issues with the issues of the Cartesian dualist.
'In a materialist view of things distinction isn't even possible, since it is an abstract procedure that is non-material.'
Not at all. In a material world-view, distinctions, as are all functions of the mind, are simply dependent on material. You are assuming that abstract procedures are non-material in your critique of materialism, which is obviously fallacious.
But I really am a lot more curious about what you actually define as 'abstrct conception'. I see OneBrow has attempted to answer for you, and I will address this in a moment, but I'd really like it from you because you have been making such definitive statements on the matter.
'Does the first chimpanzee have a notion of "water" or "peanut" not specifically tied to an individual instance of water or nut? While I would say "yes, in a primitive fashion", Feser and Cothran would say "no". Proof has been slow in coming, although the progress with ape languages may help us find an answer in the next 20-50 years.'
Thanks for the contribution - I'm still hoping Martin will define what he means when he says 'abstract concepts' etc., but from what I have read on Feser's blog, I think your assessment is fairly correct as to their position (I believe Feser talks about 'triangularity' as opposed to a specific concept of a triangle to make his distinction).
My simple answer is: I don't buy it at all. The distinction between simple or primary abstraction (i.e. from specific peanut to abstract peanut or just nut) and higher level abstraction (e.g. from specific tube to tubes to cylinders to 'cylindricity') strikes me as utterly ad hoc. I could probably accept that higher level abstraction is quantitively different from primary abstraction (i.e. it simply requires more capacity for abstraction), which of course means we are better equipped because we simply have larger brains than apes. But I see no reason at all to consider this a qualitytive difference that somehow makes one set of people 'human' and others not. We could probably find a lot of variation in the capacity for abstraction among humans, with some of them not even being able to go beyond the primary level, maybe because of some mental disorder or ailment - but would ED Feser or Martin, as good, pro-life, 'all life is sacred' Catholics, actually want to argue that these are not humans? I dare them to do so.
Finally, I would even contest that evidence suggest apes are capable of higher-level abstraction, because Koko the Gorilla and other apes that have been taught sign language or otehr symbolic languages are clearly capable of recombining words on a second or higher-level of abstraction to describe novel items. For example, they will describe melon as a 'drink fruit' or 'candy drink'. Watch here, at about 1:30.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pmuu8UEi2ko
Singring,
You are assuming that abstract procedures are non-material in your critique of materialism, which is obviously fallacious.
So let me get this clear: you think abstract procedures (or concepts, or anything else) are material?
'So let me get this clear: you think abstract procedures (or concepts, or anything else) are material?'
Read the sentence before, the one you cite is admittedly badly worded, my bad. The 'mind' is simply a label we put on the biological processes that we can consciously perceive. I therefore believe that abstract procedures are dependent on the material to 100 % and I think they are simply a manifestation of the material processes in the brain. There is very good evidence to support this view. To view the mind as in principle any way more 'distinguishable' from biological processes than, say, a bee's neurological processes in building a honeycomb is distinguishable from its biological processes is completely unwarranted on the evidence.
Maybe you have other evidence that demonstrates that what goes on in the mind is not predicated on the material brain - please cite it.
I hope this clears up any confusion.
But please, Martin, won't you finally give us your definition of 'abstract concpets' that we are still waiting on. And maybe explain why you don't consider the examples given for apes as examples of 'abstract conception'. Or are you going to continue to dance around that issue, when it was the very bedrock of your claims on what makes us human?
Singring,
So you admit then that your and Feser's belief that humans were infused with a rational soul and some point in the past (which I must assume you both hold as traditinal Catholics) is no more than that - a mere assertion?
So you're inferring from my statement that Rosenhouse didn't actually take into account the arguments that have actually been offered for humans being infused with a rational soul in his judgment about them that I therefore believe my belief about humans being infused with a rational soul is a mere assertion?
Maybe you could explain the logic behind that. I'm not seeing it.
Singring,
You hold a position for which you know you currently have no evidence at all. You're perfectly free to do so as long as you fairly acknowledge the lacking rational justification of that belief.
No, the problem is that your ADHD topic-hopping makes it impossible ever to settle a point, and the point of this post is whether Coyne's universal negative assertion is true.
You want to talk about 12 other things than the actual point of the post. If you don't feel confident in defending Coyne's assertion, why don't you just say so?
Singring,
Martin, what is your definition of an 'abstract concept'?
Generally speaking, 'concept' means the same as 'idea', except that 'concept' is used traditionally in philosophy to refer to a universal--what philosophical realists like Aristotle or Plato would call a "form."
'Abstract' is just a reference to the process by which the concept is formed in the mind from the thing itself. This is what an animal can't do.
I'm doing a post to extrapolate on this.
'So you're inferring from my statement that Rosenhouse didn't actually take into account the arguments that have actually been offered for humans being infused with a rational soul in his judgment about them that I therefore believe my belief about humans being infused with a rational soul is a mere assertion?'
So you don't admit it. But then what yre your arguments to support your belief in soul-infused humans?
'No, the problem is that your ADHD topic-hopping makes it impossible ever to settle a point, and the point of this post is whether Coyne's universal negative assertion is true.'
Martin, I have now had to ask you four times to give simple definition of what you consider 'abstract concepts', which was the very thing you claimed made us separate from animals. I have elaborated on examples for 'abstarct concepts' being present in apes no less than three times.
So far, you have done everything but address this issue, constantly asking me about other things - and then you accuse me of 'topic hopping'? Quite remarkable, really.
But I see, you finally have made an effort to define 'abstract concepts', so let's see what its all about:
'Generally speaking, 'concept' means the same as 'idea', except that 'concept' is used traditionally in philosophy to refer to a universal--what philosophical realists like Aristotle or Plato would call a "form."
'Abstract' is just a reference to the process by which the concept is formed in the mind from the thing itself. This is what an animal can't do.'
This sounds very much like my own definition. Great. But the last part is puzzling, because I have elaborated on examples where apes show exactly the capabilty of abstracting from a thing to an idea. You sadly don't engage with the evidence.
I hope the post you are preparing will address that in more detail.
Martin Cothran said...
If you don't feel confident in defending Coyne's assertion, why don't you just say so?
Coyne's assertion is low-hanging fruit, and not really defensible as an argument against Catholic tradition. It's fairly obvious thqt even is the population bottleneck was never less than 50,000, that doesn't stop one pair from receiving a soul.
Of course, there are other problems with that scenario, but if all you want to talk about is Coyne's position in this thread, there's little point in bringing them up.
OneBrow,
I don't mind talking about other things on the thread, I just don't want to run from one topic to another without addressing and hopefully resolving the main one. I'm perfectly willing to talk about others. And I would be interesting in hearing what you think are the other problems.
... abstract procedures are dependent on the material to 100 % and I think they are simply a manifestation of the material processes in the brain.
A material manifestation or an immaterial manifestation?
'A material manifestation or an immaterial manifestation?'
Topic-hopping again, Martin?
Material in the sense that it is simply a reconfiguration of molecules in the brain. How we perceive this as the self-aware creatures that we are (and I agree that human consciousness is among the most challenging areas of study ahead) is irrelevant. I see no reason to think that a 'thought' has any existence sepearte from or other than the molecules that have caused it, regardless of how I perceive it.
I could humour you and call thoughts or the mind 'immaterial'. I just don't think it does anything at all to actually explain why the mind is and what the mind is. The fact is that the mind depends to 100 % (at least as far as the evidence suggests) on the material and I therefore assume that they are identical with the material.
Singring,
The fact is that the mind depends to 100 % (at least as far as the evidence suggests) on the material and I therefore assume that they are identical with the material.
Are you saying that you are the same thing as whatever you are dependent on?
Martin,
One of the issues is archeological. The archeological record shows an abstract use of numbers from 32,000 years ago, and an abstract use of words from 8,000 years ago. this fits in well with the idea that rationality delveloped gradually and unevenly. It's fits poorly with the idea that rationality was derived with such rapidity that a single creature went from not rational to being ratonal enough to have committed the original sin.
'Are you saying that you are the same thing as whatever you are dependent on?'
Am I the same thing as my biolgical body? I'm pretty sure that I am (the evidence suggests it).
As a conscious being, I may experience things in a way that makes it appear as if my emotions, my thoughts etc. are in some way separate from my material body, but the empirical evidence suggests that this is merely an 'illusion', or, to maybe make it a bit more accurate, it is an artifact of the complex material processes going on inside my brain. A feedback loop, if you will.
Does that make those 'artifacts', those experiences or feelings that I have any less special or less useful to me as they occur? I don't see why it should.
When I analyze my biological data I reason, I deduce, I contemplate and when I listen to my favourite album or watch my favourite movie, I experience a huge rush of emotions. Realizing the objective nature of something '(even if it is one's own mind) doesn't lessen the subjective experience of it and (at least in my experience) can actually greatly enhance the experience of it.
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